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I. Introduction
In recent years, a series of bills have been introduced in various states
here in the United States which seek to protect states from the perceived
threat that “Islamic Shariah law” is “creeping” into our nation through the
American court system.1 These bills, aimed at preventing the “creeping
threat”2 of “Islamic Shariah law,”3 are generally referred to as “anti-Shariah
bills.”4
These so-called “anti-Shariah” bills can be divided into two broad
categories. The first category consists of bills, which are overtly
discriminatory on their face, and the second category consists of bills,
which contain no explicit references to “Shariah law” in their text and are,
therefore, “facially neutral.” After an overtly discriminatory “anti-Shariah”
bill in Oklahoma was ruled unconstitutional by federal courts,5 the
proponents of “anti-Shariah” legislation switched political strategies in
favor of facially neutral bills which contained no explicit references to
“Shariah law.”6 The model legislation for this new “facially neutral”

1. See American Public Policy Alliance, American Laws for American Courts,
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts/ (last visited
Oct. 12, 2013) (“Unfortunately, increasingly, . . . Shariah law principles[ ] are finding their
way into US court cases.”).
2. Christian Broadcast Network, Report: U.S. Ignoring Creeping Threat from Sharia
Law (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2010/September/Report-USIgnoring-Creeping-Threat-from-Sharia-Law/; see also Matt Duss, Creeping Sharia ‘Team B’
Report Presented to Congress, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 15 2012, 4:10 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/security/2010/09/15/176274/creeping-sharia-team-b-reportpresented-to-congress/ (quoting U.S. House Representative Trent Franks as saying “It’s clear
that the creeping threat of [S]haria poses a threat to the Constitution”).
3. See American Public Policy Alliance, supra note 1 (explaining the need “to protect
American citizens[ ]. . . [from] Islamic Shariah Law”).
4. Reference the American Public Policy Alliance (APPA) web page for references
to “creeping threat” and “Islamic Shariah law” and reference CAIR-National materials, or
general media materials, for their common usage of the phrase “anti-Shariah.”
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
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strategy goes by the name “American Laws for American Courts” 7 and is
more commonly known by the acronym ALAC.8
As these new facially neutral ALAC bills have been passed into law in
several states,9 there has been no ensuing litigation that has challenged the
constitutionality of these new facially neutral bills. Both proponents of
“anti-Shariah” legislation, as well as adversaries, seem to have accepted the
legal principle that these facially neutral ALAC bills are somehow immune
from constitutional scrutiny.10 The proponents of the new facially neutral
ALAC bills have expressed a belief that the language contained in the plain
text of these bills is the legally relevant inquiry, and a bill that contains no
explicit references to “Shariah law” is therefore immune from constitutional
scrutiny.11 The litigants who opposed “anti-Shariah” legislation in
Oklahoma, based upon the arguments asserted in that litigation, have
seemingly taken the position that the crucial legal inquiry is whether
particular “anti-Shariah” legislation has a detrimental effect upon
individuals’ ability to practice their faith, in accordance with “Shariah”
principles, in the relevant jurisdiction.12 The unstated premise underlying
this articulated legal argument is that because facially neutral ALAC bills
do not specifically reference “Shariah,” these bills have no detrimental
effect upon individuals’ ability to practice their faith in accordance with
“Shariah,” and because the bills do not effect individuals’ ability to practice
their faith, the bills are therefore immune from constitutional scrutiny.

7. See supra note 1 (“By promoting American Laws for American Courts, we are
preserving individual liberties and freedoms . . . .”).
8. See Louis Palme, CAIR-FAIL: Analysis of CAIR’s 2013 Report on Islamophobia in
the U.S., THE COUNTER JIHAD REPORT (Sept. 22, 2013), http://counterjihadreport.com/
tag/alac/ (noting that anti-Islam legislation is better known as “American Laws for American
Courts”).
9. See Council on American-Islamic Relations, A Brief Overview of the
Pervasiveness of Anti-Islamic Legislation (Jan. 2013), https://www.cair.com/images/pdf/
Pervasiveness-of-anti-Islam-legislation.pdf (providing succinct data on the status of ALAC,
or other “anti-Shariah” bills, introduced in state legislatures nationally); see also Bill
Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: Signed into Law in Kansas, Sent to
Study Committee in New Hampshire, Still Technically Alive in MI, NC, PA, & SC, GAVEL TO
GAVEL (May 29, 2012), http://gavelto gavel.us/site/2012/05/29/bans-on-court-use-ofshariainternational-law-signed-into-law-in-kansas-sent-to-study-committee-in-newhampshire-still-technically-alive-in-mi-nc-pa-sc/ (detailing the few states that have
introduced bills to ban the use of Sharia law in their courts).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.
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This article challenges both of these legal theories and boldly asserts
that the new facially neutral ALAC bills remain unconstitutional for the
exact same reasons that the overtly discriminatory Oklahoma legislation
was unconstitutional. In so doing, this article takes a legal position contrary
to the positions held by both parties involved in the seminal “anti-Shariah”
case involving the “Save Our State Amendment” in Oklahoma (“SOS
Amendment”).
This article will demonstrate that the Oklahoma SOS Amendment was
found to be unconstitutional primarily because it was enacted with the
intent to politically marginalize a subset of Americans, based upon religious
affiliation,13 in violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution. Notably, the author of this article asserts that the tangible
effects of the SOS Amendment upon the lead plaintiff’s ability to practice
his faith were wholly irrelevant, as a legal matter, to the courts’ analysis of
the constitutionality of the amendment. Furthermore, this article asserts
that the language contained in the plain text of the bills is legally irrelevant
if there is other evidence of intent to marginalize the affected community.
This article is divided into two broad categories. To provide a factual
and contextual background, Part II of this article will describe the
phenomenon of “anti-Shariah” bills by defining the term “anti-Shariah,”
documenting the prevalence of “anti-Shariah” bills, and distinguishing
between “overtly discriminatory” bills and “facially neutral” bills. Part II
will also document the litigation concerning the Oklahoma SOS
Amendment and the ensuing shift from overtly discriminatory bills to
facially neutral bills, focusing particularly on the American Laws for
American Courts (“ALAC”) model legislation and the ALAC bill
introduced in Pennsylvania. Following this factual background, Part III of
this article will focus upon legal analysis of these bills pursuant to the
United States Constitution. To that end, Part III will more carefully
examine the Oklahoma litigation, the arguments asserted therein, and the
courts’ ultimate rulings. Part III will also apply the courts’ rulings in the
Oklahoma litigation to the facially neutral ALAC legislation, using the
Pennsylvania ALAC bill as an example, and will ultimately conclude that
these rulings are as applicable to ALAC legislation as to overtly
discriminatory “anti-Shariah” legislation. In so doing, Part III will
demonstrate that the legal theories advanced by both the proponents of the
13. “Religious affiliation,” as referenced herein, is separate and distinct from religious
practice. It is my argument that facially neutral “anti-Shariah” legislation does not merely
affect persons who actively practice their faith, but also equally impacts all Americans with
a Muslim identity.
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facially neutral ALAC legislation and the plaintiff in the Oklahoma
litigation rely upon factors that are legally irrelevant. Finally, Part IV will
conclude by asserting that the crucial legal inquiry, in analyzing the
constitutionality of facially neutral ALAC legislation, is the intent to
politically marginalize persons affiliated with a particular faith or faiths.
The effect of the legislation upon individuals’ ability to engage in religious
practices is legally irrelevant, and the neutrality of the language used in the
statute is legally irrelevant, provided that there is other evidence of intent to
marginalize.
II. Overview of “Anti-Shariah” Bills and the Strategic Shift toward the
“Facially Neutral” American Laws for American Courts (ALAC) Model
A. Overview of “Anti-Shariah” Bills and Legislation
This article will use the phrase “anti-Shariah bills” or “anti-Shariah
legislation” as this is the nomenclature most frequently used to describe
such bills.14 The term “anti-Shariah bill(s)” will be used to describe
proposed legislation, or to describe the phenomenon generally; whereas the
term “anti-Shariah legislation” will be used to describe a particular bill that
has been passed into law, such as the Oklahoma SOS Amendment.
Notably, the term “anti-Shariah” will remain in quotation marks to denote
the author’s discomfort with this term. The Council on American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR), as a national organization, has adopted the phrase “antiIslam bills” or “anti-Islam legislation”15 in an effort to describe these bills
as attacking an entire religion, Islam, rather than attacking a particular
subset of that religion as expressed in a body of law, code of religious
conduct, or set of religious beliefs. To a certain degree, the Philadelphia
Office of CAIR has used the phrase “anti-Muslim bills” or “anti-Muslim

14. See Alicia Gay, ACLU Lens: The Truth Behind the Anti-Sharia Movement,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 1, 2011, 2:52 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
national-security-religion-belief/aclu-lens-truth-behind-anti-sharia-movement (discussing,
and referring to the “anti-Sharia” movement); but see Council on American-Islamic
Relations, supra note 9, at 1 (alternately referring to such legislation as “anti-Islam” bills);
Council on American-Islamic Relations, Securing Religious Liberty Handbook (Feb. 2012)
http://www.cair.com/images/pdf/CAIR-Securing-Religious-Liberty-Handbook.pdf
(alternately referring to such legislation as “anti-Muslim” bills). The author of this article
was one of the CAIR employees who suggested that the term “anti-Muslim” most accurately
describes this legislation.
15. CAIR formally began using the term “anti-Islam” in January 2013.
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legislation”16 to reflect the fact that I, as the author of this article, believe
that these bills are targeted at a particular subset of the American people
and therefore, are designed to target a people, not an obscure set of
religious laws or any set of religious beliefs. Nonetheless, as the author of
this article, I maintain my position regarding the true target of the so-called
“anti-Shariah bills,” I will use the phrase “anti-Shariah” throughout this
article—always in quotation marks—to reflect the most commonly used
description of these bills.
“Anti-Shariah” bills are an incredibly common phenomenon in the
United States today. As of the end of 2012, seventy-eight (78) such bills
had been introduced in thirty-one (31) states.17 Furthermore, six (6) states
had passed such bills into law: Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, and Tennessee.18 At the time I became involved in
challenging such legislation, in late 2011, more than fifty (50) bills had
been introduced in twenty-three (23) states.19 Furthermore, four (4) states
had passed such bills into law (Kansas and South Dakota had not yet passed
“anti-Shariah” bills into law).20
B. The Oklahoma “Save Our State” Amendment, Litigation, and Outcome
An example of an overtly discriminatory “anti-Shariah” bill is
Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” Amendment.21 This amendment to the
16. See Council on American-Islamic Relations, What Happens Without CAIR,
http://pa.cair.com/news/what-happens-without-cair/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (stating that,
at the time the article was written, North Carolina passed “anti-Muslim” legislation).
17. See Council on American-Islamic Relations, supra note 9, at 1 (“In 2011 and
2012, 78 bills or amendments aimed at interfering with Islamic religious practices or
vilifying Islam were considered in 31 states and the U.S. Congress.”).
18. Id.
19. See Memorandum from the Council on American-Islamic Relations Pa., Phila.
Office to the Pa. Gen. Assemb., H.R., Judiciary Comm. 3 (Jan. 27. 2012), available at
http://pa.cair.com/files/cr/Memo%20in%20opposition%20to%20HB%202029.pdf (citing the
prevalence of ALAC bills and legislation in a memorandum opposing a similar bill in the
Pennsylvania legislature).
20. Id. The original memorandum incorrectly asserted that Texas had passed an “antiShariah” bill into law prior to the submission of that memorandum. That was inaccurate. At
the conclusion of 2012, prior to the symposium presentation at which this material was first
presented, Texas had not passed an “anti-Shariah” bill into law).
21. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2012) (“On May 25, 2010, the
Oklahoma House of Representatives and Senate House passed House Joint Resolution 1056
(“HJR 1056”) [which] directed ‘the Secretary of State to refer to the people for their
approval or rejection a proposed amendment to Section 1 of Article VII of the [Oklahoma]
Constitution . . . [known as] the Save Our State Amendment.’”).
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Oklahoma constitution was posed directly to the voters of that state through
a ballot initiative known as “State Question 755.”22 Initially, the Oklahoma
House of Representatives and Senate passed a joint resolution directing the
Secretary of State to refer to the people of Oklahoma a proposed
amendment to be titled the “Save Our State Amendment” (referred to
herein as the “SOS amendment”).23 The explicit language of the proposed
SOS Amendment would add to the Oklahoma constitution two explicit
references to “Sharia Law.”24 In the first instance, the amendment indicated
that Oklahoma courts may apply the law “of another state of the United
States provided [that] the law of the other state does not include Sharia
Law, [sic.] in making judicial decisions.”25 In the second instance, the
amendment explicitly stated that “the courts shall not consider . . . Sharia
Law.”26 In addition to these explicit references to “Sharia Law,” the
Oklahoma Attorney General added a definition of “Sharia Law” which
demonstrated a more overt intention of targeting Islam and Muslims:
“Sharia Law is Islamic law [sic.]. It is based on two principal sources, the
Koran and the teachings of Mohammed.”27
In addition to these overt references to “Sharia Law” in the plain text
of the SOS Amendment, there was also non-textual evidence of an antiMuslim discriminatory intent. As noted in the federal district court decision
enjoining the SOS Amendment, one of the authors of the amendment had
publicly acknowledged that the purpose of the amendment was to target
“Shariah Law.”28 More precisely, the amendment was proposed “to
establish a legal impediment against the ‘looming threat’ of Sharia Law in
the United States.”29 More disturbingly, however, the same sponsor also
indicated that the bill was designed to target “Shariah Law” in an effort to
target American Muslims, whose “principles,” he believed, were contrary to
the “Judeo-Christian” principles upon which America was founded.30
22. Id. at 1118.
23. Id. at 1117.
24. Id. at 1118.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir 2012).
28. Awad v. Ziriax, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11960, at 8 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
29
Id. at 9.
30. See id. at 8–9 (“Specifically, plaintiff asserts that State Question 755’s origins
establish that the amendment’s actual purpose is to disapprove of plaintiff's faith. In support,
plaintiff cites to one of the authors of State Question 755, Representative Rex Duncan’s,
statement that ‘America was founded on Judeo-Christian principles’ and the amendment's
purpose was to ensure that Oklahoma's courts are not used to ‘undermine those founding
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After the SOS Amendment was approved by the voters of the State of
Oklahoma, but before the bill went into effect, a lawsuit was filed
challenging its validity on constitutional grounds.31 More specifically, an
Oklahoma Muslim, Muneer Awad, who at the time was employed as the
Executive Director of the Oklahoma chapter of the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations, filed a lawsuit alleging that the SOS Amendment
violated his constitutional rights under the Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.32 This lawsuit was ultimately
successful. A federal district court judge ruled in Mr. Awad’s favor on
CAIR initiated litigation on November 29, 2010,33 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed on January 10, 2012,34 and the
federal district court ultimately granted a motion for summary judgment in
Mr. Awad’s favor on August 15, 2013.35
C. The After-Effects of Oklahoma: The New “Facially Neutral” American
Laws for American Courts Model
The ALAC model legislation was created as a direct result of the
legislation involving the Oklahoma SOS Amendment. In fact, the author of
the ALAC model legislation, Brooklyn-based attorney David Yerushalmi,36
has explained that model ALAC legislation “differ[s] from the failed
Oklahoma amendment in one key way: They don’t mention Sharia.”37
Moreover, he opined, at the time that the model legislation was created and
being introduced to the public that, because the bills are “facially neutral,”
i.e., contain no explicit references to “Sharia,” they can “avoid[ ] the sticky
problems of our First Amendment jurisprudence.”38 The American Public
principles,’ and Representative Duncan's further statement that the purpose of the measure
was to establish a legal impediment against the ‘looming threat’ of Sharia Law in the United
States.”).
31. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (challenging the validity of the
bill on constitutional grounds).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
35. Awad v. Ziriax, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115397 (W.D. Okla. 2013).
36. See Memorandum from the Council on American-Islamic Relations Pa., supra
note 19 (noting that although Yerushalmi has not always openly acknowledged that he is the
author (or primary author) of the ALAC legislation, he is widely believed to be the author
and he openly acknowledges his interest in the success of ALAC).
37. Id. at Ex. G (citing Tim Murphy, Meet the White Supremacist Leading the GOP’s
Anti-Sharia Crusade (published Mar. 2, 2011)).
38. Id.
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Policy Alliance (APPA),39 the organization created by Yerushalmi and
others to promote the ALAC model legislation, has continued to assert that
the facial neutrality of ALAC renders these bills immune from
constitutional scrutiny. In a statement issued on August 19, 2013, the
APPA reported the successful passage of an ALAC bill in Oklahoma on
that same date in the following manner: “Fortunately, there is an effective
and constitutional alternative to measures such as SQ755[,] and . . . [t]hat
law is called American laws for American Courts (ALAC).”40 As of the
date of the submission of this article for publication, there have been no
court rulings regarding the constitutionality of the new ALAC legislation in
Oklahoma.
Though the APPA, and other ALAC supporters, have publicly praised
the facial neutrality of the model legislation, none has denied that ALAC’s
primary purpose is to marginalize Islam and Muslims. The APPA has
asserted that the ALAC model legislation was created specifically to guard
against “the infiltration and incursion of foreign laws and foreign legal
doctrines, especially Islamic Shariah Law.”41 In addition to its explicit
reference to the word “Islamic,” the APPA has further acknowledge its
intent to target Islam and Muslims, and no other Abrahamic faiths and their
adherents by clarifying that the model ALAC legislation does not interfere
with “Jewish law or Catholic Canon Law” because these religious laws do

39. The APPA, the official creators and promoters of ALAC legislation, is an
intriguing organization. As one report notes: “The American Public Policy Alliance is
responsible for American Laws for American Courts, the anti-Islam template legislation that
has been considered by lawmakers across the nation. While the organization has a
professional-looking website, it’s Washington, DC [sic] address is a UPS Store.” See
Legislating Fear: Islamophobia and its Impact in the United States, Council on AmericanIslamic Relations 2013 Report, at p.20. Notably, as of the date this article was submitted for
publication, the APPA’s website lists no staff members and no members of a Board of
Directors. Despite these presumptive limitations, however, the APPA has created model
legislation which has been introduced in state legislatures nationwide and has been signed
into law in several states. In other words, though the 2013 Report, supra, seeks to discredit
the APPA, the APPA has arguably been more successful in its advocacy on this issue then
those who oppose it (including the authors of the 2013 Report).
40. See ALAC Protects Constitutional Rights Against Foreign Law, APPA, Aug. 19,
2013 (referring to an article in American Thinker which analyzed the weaknesses of the SOS
Amendment and which is publicly available at http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/09/
american_laws_for_american_courts.html), available at http://publicpolicyalliance.org/
category/american-laws-for-american-courts.
41. Memorandum in Opposition, Ex. C (citing American Laws for American Courts,
public policy alliance).
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not pose the same threat to constitutional rights or public policy as “Islamic
Shariah Law.”42
The nativist rhetoric that seems to underlie ALAC is not surprising in
light of statements reportedly made by the model legislation’s purported
author, David Yerushalmi. The New York Times has reported that the author
of the ALAC model legislation has been quoted as saying that “most of the
fundamental differences between the races are genetic” and that “there’s a
reason the founding fathers did not give women or black slaves the right to
vote.”43 The Anti-Defamation League has quoted him as saying that
African Americans are a “relatively murderous race killing itself.”44 He has
also been quoted as saying that Jews “destroy their host nations like a fatal
parasite” and that “America was the handiwork of faithful Christians,
mostly men, and almost entirely white.”45
Despite this, rather alarming, history of ALAC, I first became aware of
the “anti-Shariah” movement in November 2011 when ALAC legislation
was introduced in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s General
Assembly.46 At the time, the Oklahoma SOS Amendment had been
defeated at the federal district court level but the appellate court had not yet
issued a ruling on appeal. “Anti-Shariah” bills had been passed in four (4)
states, and the new “facially neutral” ALAC legislation was relatively new.
The fact that ALAC legislation was introduced in Pennsylvania is
interesting in light of Pennsylvania’s history of religious plurality. The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was established as William Penn’s “Holy
Experiment” after he came into possession of the territory in 1681. When
the Pennsylvania constitution was drafted in 1776, it included both a Free
Exercise Clause and an Establishment Clause in order to protect its citizens’
religious liberty. The religion of Islam, which “anti-Shariah” legislation
aims to target, was specifically discussed during debates regarding the
precise language of these religious clauses. In that particular debate, the
appropriately named “Constitutionalists,” who favored religious freedom
and pluralism, eventually won the debate against the equally aptly named
42. Id. at Ex. D.
43. Id. at Ex. E (citing Andrea Elliot, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2011).
44. Id. at Ex. F, (citing David Yerushalmi: A Driving Force Behind Anti-Sharia Efforts
in the U.S., Anti-Defamation League, Jan. 13, 2012).
45. Id. at Ex. G.
46. The bill, known as House Bill 2029, was actually introduced on June 14, 2011,
with little public awareness of its existence. The bill came to my attention when it was
referred to committee, specifically the House Judiciary Committee, on November 18, 2011.
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“Anticonstitutionalists,” who advocated for governmental reliance only
upon Protestant values. As an enduring sign of its dedication to religious
pluralism, Pennsylvania continues to have large populations of minority
religions that are much less frequently found living in cohesive
communities in other parts of the country. Well-known examples of this
phenomenon include the Amish and the Quakers, but there are also less
well-known religious communities, an example of which can be seen at the
“Ephrata Cloisters,” which advertise themselves as the “home of the
wooden pillow.” Minority faiths have even affected generally applicable
laws in Pennsylvania. For example, Pennsylvania marriage law allows for
what is known as “self-executing” marriage licenses to accommodate the
Quaker faith. In light of this history of religious pluralism, the introduction
of ALAC legislation in Pennsylvania raised concerns among
Pennsylvanians that, if an ALAC bill can pass in Pennsylvania, then it can
pass anywhere.
The ALAC bill, which was introduced in Pennsylvania, House Bill
2029 (HB 2029), was titled “American and Pennsylvania Laws for
Pennsylvania Courts” and closely followed the “facially neutral” mandate
of the APPA and its model ALAC legislation.47 Though the bill was, in
fact, “facially neutral,” the political context surrounding the bill made it
evident that the bill was designed to marginalize Islam and Muslims.
The strongest evidence that HB 2029 was designed to target Muslims,
and Pennsylvanians associated with the Islamic faith, is the bill’s original
co-sponsorship memorandum entitled “American and Pennsylvania Laws
for Pennsylvania Courts—Shariah Law,” thereby plainly indicating, in its
title no less, the bill’s primary purpose of targeting “Shariah law”—not all
foreign laws.48 The memo continued to mention “Shariah law” multiple
times throughout its text terms, as something which is “foreign,” ominous,
and menacing.49 Copying, almost verbatim, the language used by the
APPA in describing the model ALAC legislation, the memo warns that
“[u]nfortunately, increasingly, foreign laws and legal doctrines—including
and especially Shariah law—are finding their way into U.S. court cases.”50
Most alarmingly, this co-sponsorship memo singles out Islam as the target
of HB 2029 and specifically warns of “Shariah law, which is inherently
47. The bill’s sponsor acknowledged that HB 2029 was based upon the model ALAC
legislation proposed by the APPA. See Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 36, at 3.
48. Id at Ex. I.
49. Id.
50. Id. at Ex. C.
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hostile to our constitutional liberties.”51 Because “Shariah” is a common
reference to the Islamic faith, and its adherents, the allegation that
“Shariah” is “inherently hostile to our constitutional liberties” should be
understood as an assertion that the bill’s sponsor is asserting a belief that
both the Islamic faith and its adherents are inherently “hostile” to the
United States Constitution and the cultural values reflected therein.
Perhaps admonished by the APPA, and other creators of the model
ALAC legislation, the bill’s sponsor appeared to have realized the
constitutional problems created by blatant references to “Shariah law” and
circulated a second co-sponsorship memorandum regarding HB 2029 on
October 18, 2011.52 This second memorandum is a more sanitized version
of her original co-sponsorship memorandum and makes no explicit
references to “Shariah law.”53 The omission of explicit references to Islam,
Muslims, or “Shariah,” in the second memorandum did not negate the
earlier evidence of intent to target Islam, Muslims, and “Shariah” expressed
in the previous memo.
In addition to the co-sponsorship memoranda, there was other
evidence of the APPA’s intent to target Muslims through its ALAC
legislation in Pennsylvania. First, the plain text of the bill created a carveout exception for businesses so that “foreign law” could still be applied to
business entities in certain circumstances. This carve-out exception, once
again, demonstrated that HB 2029 was not designed to target all foreign
law, just “Islamic Sharia law.” The second example is the public hearing
on the bill, which was scheduled for December 2012 when there were no
remaining voting days in the legislative session. Without any remaining
voting days scheduled before the bill was scheduled to expire, the only
plausible explanation for the public hearings is that the hearings were
planned to serve as a forum, taking place within a state governmental
institution, in which Muslims were to be publicly portrayed as “inherently
hostile to our constitutional liberties.” Finally, it is plausible that the nonbinding “Year of the Bible Resolution,”54 which was passed by a
unanimous vote in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in January
2012, was motivated, in some extent, by the then-current political history
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at Ex. J.
53. See Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 36, at Ex. J.
54. See H.R. 535, 196th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012), available at http://
www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2011
&sessInd=0&billBody=H&billTyp=R&billNbr=0535&pn=2983 (passing the Resolution by
unanimous vote).
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surrounding the anti-Shariah bills in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania.
Coincidentally, or not, also in January 2012, the Tenth Circuit issued its
ruling against the SOS Amendment in Oklahoma and, in its opinion, opined
that the SOS Amendment would have passed constitutional scrutiny of
ripeness grounds if it had been passed by the Oklahoma legislature as a
non-binding resolution.55
Ultimately, the Pennsylvania resolution expired as an operation of law
when the governor did not sign it into law before the end of the legislative
session.
III. Constitutional Analysis of “Anti-Shariah” Legislation
A. Overview of Relevant Constitutional Law
To understand how and why “anti-Shariah” bills, including ALAC,
violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment, it is necessary to
review the particular case law that is most relevant to a “facially neutral”
“anti-Shariah” bill. As described in further detail below, I believe that the
model ALAC legislation violates the Establishment Clause because it
constitutes a government disapproval of Islam and therefore fails the
“endorsement test.” I further believe that the bills’ facial neutrality are
insufficient to confer constitutionality because there is such overwhelming
extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent that ALAC bills cannot be
understood to be a “neutral law of general applicability” that would avoid
implication of the Free Exercise Clause.
The Supreme Court has determined that a government action violates
the Establishment Clause of the federal constitution if it has either the
intended purpose or the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.56
Moreover, Justice O’Connor describes an analytic framework for applying
the “Lemon test” which has become known as the “endorsement test.”57
Pursuant to this “endorsement test,” a government action will fail the
“Lemon test” if that action conveys a message of government endorsement
or disapproval of a particular religion.58 In her articulation of the
55. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (discussing the viability of the
bill if it were non-binding).
56. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (describing the “excessive
entanglement” between government and religion).
57. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(explaining the endorsement test for applying the Lemon test).
58. Id. at 688.
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“endorsement test,” Justice O’Connor articulates the reason why
government approval or disapproval violates the Establishment Clause.
According to Justice O’Connor, government endorsement or disapproval of
religion results in political alienation of adherents of the disfavored faith,
and it is this political alienation, which is not permitted by the federal
Establishment Clause. As stated by Justice O’Connor:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence
to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political
community. Government can run afoul of [the Establishment Clause] in
two principal ways…. The second and more direct infringement is
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message.59

Justice O’Connor’s clarification, which would later become known as
the “endorsement test,” prohibits governmental “disapproval” of religion
because of the effect that such government disapproval has upon the
political standing of both adherents and “nonadherents” of a particular
religion. Pursuant to O’Connor’s analysis, the danger of “anti-Shariah”
bills generally, ALAC bills in particular, and HB 2029 as an individual
example is that these bills create an official government disapproval of a
particular religion, Islam, which sends a message that the identified
“adherents” of the Islamic religion, Muslims, are outsiders, not full
members of the political community.
The proponents of ALAC, in arguing the undefeatable merits of
“facially neutral” legislation, have seemingly (and wrongfully) assumed
that a “facially neutral” bill is, by definition, a “neutral law of general
applicability.” However, whereas the latter is immune from Free Exercise
Clause scrutiny, the Supreme Court has clarified that the former is not.60 In
determining whether legislation is a “neutral law of general applicability,”
the Court has specifically indicated that courts may consider all evidence of
discriminatory intent, including extrinsic evidence, and is not limited to the
plain text of the legislation itself:
We reject the contention advanced by the city that our inquiry must end
with the text of the laws at issue. Facial neutrality is not determinative.

59. Id. at 687–88 (emphasis added).
60. See Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hileah, 508 U.S. 520, 560 (1993) (explaining that
facially neutral legislation may still be subject to Free Exercise Clause scrutiny).
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The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends
beyond facial discrimination. The Clause “forbids subtle departures
from neutrality” and “covert suppression of particular religious
beliefs.” Official action that targets conduct for distinctive treatment
cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial
neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental
hostility which is masked as well as overt.61

Pursuant to this analysis, ALAC’s facial neutrality will not render
these bills immune from constitutional scrutiny if there is extrinsic evidence
of intent to target Islam and Muslims.
The Free Exercise Clause is relevant to analysis of ALAC bills for
another reason as well. Contrary to the arguments asserted by the
proponents of ALAC legislation, and contrary to the stated purpose of HB
2029, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that religion cannot
be used as an excuse to circumvent generally applicable laws. For example,
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be
used to circumvent generally applicable criminal laws relating to bigamy62
and ingestion of controlled substances.63 The Free Exercise Clause also
cannot be used to circumvent laws designed for the protection of children,64
the regulation of business,65 the payment of taxes,66 and issues involving
national security and the regulation of the military.67 Given the plentitude
of these cases, it is undisputable that, under existing Supreme Court
jurisprudence, no law (foreign or otherwise) which violates the constitution
can be upheld by any court in the United States. Therefore, the ALAC
laws, which seek to prevent the same harm already prevented by a body of
law originating in 1878, cannot be intended to prevent the same harm.
Instead, the laws exist for one primary purpose: to label American Muslims

61. See id. at 534 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
62. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–67 (1878) (disallowing the use of
the Free Exercise Clause to defend against the criminal charge of bigamy).
63. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889–90 (1990) (holding that “because
respondents’ ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that
prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny
respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from the use of the
drug”).
64. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (affirming appellant’s
conviction for violating the state child labor laws for engaging her child in street preaching).
65. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (relating to Sunday closing laws).
66. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 253 (1982) (relating to Social Security taxes).
67. See Gilette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (relating to registration with
Selective Service).
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as political outsiders, not full members of the political community, whose
values are “inherently hostile” to traditional American values.
B. Legal Analysis of the Oklahoma “Save Our State” Amendment
Litigation and (Lack of) Similar Lawsuits
In his lawsuit against the State of Oklahoma, Muneer Awad raised
claims under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.68
He claimed that the SOS Amendment affected him as a Muslim citizen of
Oklahoma for two distinct sets of reasons. First, he asserted that the
amendment constituted an official governmental disapproval of his religion
and was therefore unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.69
Second, he asserted that the amendment would directly affect the validity of
both his will and his marriage, both of which invoked “sharia law.”70 The
courts, in considering Mr. Awad’s claims on the merits, also had to render
decisions on threshold issues such as ripeness and standing.71
Though the courts ultimately ruled in Mr. Awad’s favor on all legal
issues raised in the case, it is the court’s holding on the issue of standing
that is perhaps the most interesting. In ruling that Mr. Awad’s noneconomic injuries were sufficient to confer standing upon him, the court
held the following:
Like the plaintiffs who challenged the highway crosses in American
Atheists, Mr. Awad suffers a form of “personal and unwelcome contact”
with an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution that would target his
religion for disfavored treatment. As a Muslim and citizen of
Oklahoma, Mr. Awad is “directly affected by the law[ ]. . . .”72

This language, on the issue of standing, goes to the heart of the harm
of the anti-Shariah movement.
The critical harm is the political
marginalization of the American Muslim community—the official message

68. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
69. Id. at 1119.
70. Id.
71. Ripeness was an issue in the case because Mr. Awad initiated legal action after the
voters of Oklahoma had approved the amendment—but, importantly, before the amendment
actually went into effect. Standing became an issue in the case because the state argued that,
because Mr. Awad’s injuries were non-economic in nature, those injuries were insufficient
to confer standing.
72. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1122.
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from American Muslims’ own government that they are not “full members
of the political community.”73
This language, from the highest court to rule on the Oklahoma SOS
Amendment, is particularly interesting when conducting a strategic analysis
of “anti-Shariah” bill litigation. The Oklahoma litigation was the first
lawsuit directly opposing anti-Shariah legislation and has been the only
such lawsuit as of the date of the submission of this article. The Council on
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which employed Mr. Awad at the
time the lawsuit was initiated, has launched a far-reaching legislative and
public education campaign against these bills—but has never initiated legal
action against any of the bills passed into law in other states. In addition,
no other legal organization, including CAIR’s co-counsel in the Oklahoma
litigation, has challenged “anti-Shariah” legislation in any other state. The
SOS Amendment litigation was successful at every level, every contested
hearing, and on every legal issue raised. However, to date, it has been the
only litigation on this issue.
C. Legal Analysis of the “Facially Neutral” American Laws for American
Courts Legislation
As the author of this article, I am also employed by CAIR and I have
also advocated against “anti-Shariah” legislation, an ALAC bill introduced
in Pennsylvania, both through media and public education campaigns and
through direct legislative advocacy. Furthermore, I have benefited from the
knowledge and experience of other CAIR chapters, and CAIR-National,
while engaging in these efforts.
What has fascinated me during this process is the extent to which
CAIR (and, presumably, other opponents of “anti-Shariah” legislation,
including its co-counsel in the Oklahoma legislation) has seemingly bought
into the APPA’s stated belief that “facially neutral” ALAC bills are
immune from constitutional scrutiny.
Litigation was initiated in Oklahoma for two reasons: (1) because
Oklahoma was a state in which “anti-Shariah” legislation passed which also
had a CAIR chapter in the state, and (2) because Oklahoma was a state in
which CAIR found a plaintiff, Mr. Awad, who would be directly affected if
courts could not consider “Shariah law.” This direct effect would occur
because Mr. Awad, rather unusually for an American Muslim, had both a
marriage and a will that directly invoked “Shariah law.” CAIR was
73.

See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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specifically looking for a plaintiff who could assert such a direct effect,
presumably because it believed that “anti-Shariah” legislation could only be
successfully challenged in a court of law if it directly effected individuals’
ability to practice their faith.
Therefore, when the facially neutral ALAC bill was introduced in
Pennsylvania, many of my colleagues (including persons, associated with
both CAIR and its co-counsel, who were involved in the Awad litigation)
expressed concerns that the facially neutral ALAC legislation could not
support an effective constitutional challenge. However, if my legal analysis
is correct, the new facially neutral “anti-Shariah” bills are not immune from
constitutional challenge simply because they fail to produce plaintiffs who
experience a “direct effect” upon their ability to practice their faith. If the
bills are unconstitutional because they label Muslims as political outsiders,
as not full members of the political community, then this labeling process
violates the Establishment Clause as understood through the “endorsement
test.” This labeling process would adversely affect all Muslims, regardless
of an individual’s degree of religiosity or religious observance, because the
label would attach to all persons who are identified as “adherents of the
disfavored religion.”
Therefore, notwithstanding the apparent consensus between the “antiShariah” movement’s proponents and opponents, I contend that the
“facially neutral” ALAC legislation is unconstitutional for the exact same
reasons as Oklahoma’s SOS amendment. As noted in Lukumi Babalu
Aye,74 when determining whether a bill was enacted with discriminatory
purpose, “[f]acial neutrality is not determinative.” Courts may consider
extrinsic evidence of discriminatory purpose and is not limited to the plain
text of the statute. As described above, there is ample evidence of ALAC’s
intended purpose to target “Shariah law” and the adherents of that faith. In
fact, the APPA has made no secret of its intended purpose. And, it is this
purpose—the intention to convey a governmental “disapproval” of the
Islamic faith and to communicate to American Muslims that they are
“outsiders, not full members of the political community—which renders
ALAC unconstitutional.

74. See Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hileah, 508 U.S. 520, 560 (1993) (explaining that
facially neutral legislation may still be subject to Free Exercise Clause scrutiny).
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IV. Conclusion
It is possible that this Conclusion should be more appropriately named
an Epilogue. The research contained in this article was orally presented at a
symposium at Washington & Lee University School of Law on February
15, 2013. However, shortly before the submission of this article—on April
19, 2013, to be exact—a new chapter was written on the status of the
ALAC movement. On that date, ALAC legislation was signed into law in
Oklahoma. The APPA bragged on its website, in a post published that
same date, that the facially neutral ALAC which had just passed into law
possessed none of the constitutional vulnerabilities that the SOS
Amendment had possessed—all while simultaneously acknowledging that
the facially neutral ALAC legislation had the exact same intended purpose
as the SOS Amendment.
It will be interesting to see what will become of this new ALAC bill in
Oklahoma. To date, both CAIR and its co-counsel in the SOS litigation
have seemingly agreed with the APPA regarding the legal significance of
ALAC’s facial neutrality. Following the enactment of the Oklahoma
ALAC bill, CAIR told an interviewer at the Huffington Post: “These bills
don’t have any real-world effect. Their only purpose is to allow people to
vilify Islam,” said Corey Saylor, CAIR’s legislative affairs director, of the
more recent bills.75 However, the same Huffington Post article also opined,
“The new bills, however, are more vague and mention only foreign laws,
with no references to Shariah or Islam . . . All of that makes them harder to
challenge as a violation of religious freedom.”76
The question I would like to leave the reader with, at the end of this
article, is not whether opinion stated in this Huffington Post article is
correct—I have already posited to you that it is not. My question is
whether any litigants, or their counsel, will rise to the challenge of
contesting these bills in court? This is a rhetorical question, of course, but
one which deserves to be asked. Because the APPA, Yerushalmi, and other
proponents of the “anti-Shariah” movement have demonstrated no intention
to surrender. In fact, they have displayed a remarkable audacity to admit to
using legal trickery in an effort to circumvent constitutional law (the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause) while simultaneously

75. Omar Sacirbey, Anti-Shariah Movement Gains Success, HUFFINGTON POST (May
17, 2013), available at http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2013/05/17/anti-shariah-movementgains-success_n_3290110.html.
76. Id.
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achieving its stated goal of passing admittedly discrimnatory anti-Muslim
violation.
The question is whether anyone else will have the necessary audacity
to try to stop them.

